

Message Text

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PAGE 01 GENEVA 07545 191921Z

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ACTION EUR-12

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9728

INFO ALL CSCE CAPIALS 227

AMEMBASSY OSLO

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

USLO SACLANT NORFOLK VA

USDOCOSOUTH

CINCLANT

C O N F I D E N T I A L GENEVA 7545

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (MRN SHOULD READ 7545 VICE 74)

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PARM, CSCE

SUBJECT: CSCE: CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES;TURKISH AREA PROBLEM

REF: STATE 273267

1. FOLLOWING ARE US DEL'S ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS POSED IN REFTTEL
CONCERNING TURKISH AND ALLIED THINKING ON AREA PROBLEM.

2. (Q.) ARE TURKS TAKING A POSITION THAT TURKEY LIES ENTIRELY IN
EUROPE? (A.) IN DISCUSSIONS OF THIS ISSUE AT NATO CAUCUSES,
TURKS HAVE DRAWN DISTINCTION BETWEEN GEOGRAPHIC AND POLITICAL
CRITERIA. THEY HAVE TAKEN POSIION THAT ALTHOUGH ANATOLIA IS
OUTSIDE EUROPE GEOGRAPHICALLY, ALL OF TURKEY SHOULD BE CONSIDERED
IN EUROPE IN POLITICAL TERMS AND PARTICULARLY IN RESPECT TO CSCE.

CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 02 GENEVA 07545 191921Z

THUS, THEYHAVE FAVORED A UK FORMULA WHICH SPECIFICALLY DESCRIBES

TURKEY AS LYING IN EUROPE (GENEVA 7260) AND HAVE OPPOSED FORMULATIONS TERMING TURKEY A STATE WHOSE TERRITORY "EXTENDS BEYOND EUROPE." THIS POSITION, HOWEVER, HAS MADE IT DIFFICULT FOR TURKISH DELEGATION TO FIND APPROPRIATE RATIONALE FOR DEFENDING THE TURKISH GENERAL STAFF'S INSISTENCE ON EXEMPTING CENTRAL ANATOLIA. ORIGINALLY, TURKS TOOK POSITION AT CAUCUS THAT TURKEY SHOULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO INCLUDE ALL OF ITS "TERRITORY IN ASIA" SINCE SOVIETS WOULD NOT EVEN BE INCLUDING ALL OF THEIR TERRITORY IN EUROPE (GENEVA 6290). ON DEC 13, HOWEVER, TURKISH REP TOLD US THAT HIS DEL WOULD NOT USE THIS RATIONALE AT SUB-COMMITTEE AND HE ADMITTED THAT THEY WERE SEARCHING, WITH DIFFICULTY, FOR SOME OTHER LINE OF ARGUMENT. TURKISH REP COMPLAINED THAT TURKISH DEL WAS "CAUGHT IN THE MIDDLE" BETWEEN THEIR GENERAL STAFF AND OTHER CSCE PARTICIPANTS.

3. (Q.) HOW STRONG IS TURKISH DESIRE TO COVER SOVIET BLACK SEA AND CAUCASUS AREAS, IN ADDITION TO SOVIET WESTERN BOUNDARY AREA? (A.) TURKS WOULD LIKE TO COVER SOVIET BLACK SEAS AND CAUCASUS AREAS BUT PROBABLY WOULD NOT INSIST UPON IT IN FACE OF VIGOROUS SOVIET OPPOSITION (SEE ALSO PARAS 4 AND 5 BELOW).

4. (Q.) ARE THE TURKS WILLING TO ACCEPT A FULLY RECIPROCAL APPLICATION TO THE USSR AND TURKEY IN THE BLACK SEA AND CAUCASUS AREAS? (A.) TURKS HAVE SAID THAT APPLICATION TO TURKEY WOULD HAVE TO BE "PROPORTIONAL" (GENEVA 6290), NOT FULLY RECIPROCAL, SINCE TURKISH TERRITORY IS SO MUCH SMALLER THAN THAT OF USSR, AND BECAUSE THEY WANT TO INSURE EXEMPTION OF CENTRAL ANATOLIA. THEY HAVE NOT SPECIFIED WHAT THE PROPORTION SHOULD BE, HOWEVER.

5. (Q.) WOULD TURKS BE AMENABLE TO NO OR SHARPLY LIMITED APPLICATION OF CBMS ALONG SOUTHERN BORDERS OF USSR IF CORRESPONDING PORTIONS OF TURKEY ARE LIKEWISE EXCLUDED? (A.) TURKS HAVE INFORMED CAUCUS (GENEVA 6290) THAT THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO NOTIFY MANEUVERS IN PROPORTIONAL ZONE ALONG BLACK SEA, AEGEAN AND (WITH SOME EXCEPTIONS) MEDITERRANEAN COASTS ONLY IF SOVIETS AGREED TO GIVE NOTIFICATION IN ZONE ALONG ITS BLACK SEA COAST. THUS, IF SOVIETS EXEMPTED SOUTHERN BORDERS FROM NOTIFICATION, TURKS WOULD PROBABLY WANT TO EXEMPT ALL OF ANATOLIA AS THE "CORRESPONDING PORTION".

6. (Q.) HOW STRONGLY DO OTHER ALLIES FEEL THAT SOVIET BLACK SEA

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 GENEVA 07545 191921Z

AND CAUCASUS AREAS BE COVERED? WOULD THEY BE WILLING TO EXCLUDE ALL AREAS OF THE USSR OTHER THAN WESTERN BOUNDARY AREA? (A.) OTHER ALLIED REPS ON SUB-COMMITTEE HAVE INDICATED STRONG INTEREST IN COVERING USSR AREA ALONG BALTIC AS WELL AS WESTERN (LAND) BOUNDARY AREA. OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT THEY ARE CONSIDERABLY LESS INTERESTED IN COVERAGE OF ENTIRE SOVIET BLACK SEAS AREA AND CAUCASUS. SHOULD BE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT ALL ALLIES FAVOR COVERAGE OF WESTERN REACHES OF SOVIET TERRITORY IN ZONE OF SUBSTANTIAL

DEPTH AND THAT SUCH A ZONE WOULD INCLUDE PORTIONS OF BLACK SEA COASTS OF MOLDAVIAN AND UKRAINIAN REPUBLICS.

7. (Q.) HOW STRONG IS THE TURKISH DESIRE TO EXCLUDE THEIR NON-EUROPEAN FRONTIERS (I.E. WITH IRAN, IRAQ, AND SYRIA)? IF THE TURKS COULD OBTAIN THIS EXCEPTION, WOULD THEY BE WILLING TO ABANDON THEIR DESIRE TO COVER SOVIE BLACK SEA AND CAUCASUS AREAS? WHAT ARE TURKISH PREFERENCES AS BETWEEN THESE OBJECTIVES?

(A.) WE BELIEVE TURKS ARE DETERMINED TO EXCLUDE THEIR NON-EUROPEAN FRONTIER AREAS FROM NOTIFICATION AND THAT THIS IS MORE IMPORTANT TO THEM THAN SECURING COVERAGE OF SOVIET BLACK SEA AND CAUCASUS AREAS. HOWEVER, IF THEY COULD NOT OBTAIN COVERAGE OF THESE SOVIET AREAS, TURKS HAVE SAID THEY WOULD WANT TO EXCLUDE VIRTUALLY ALL OF ANATOLIA, AS NOTED ABOVE, NOT JUST THEIR NON-EUROPEAN FRONTIERS.

8. (Q.) HOW STRONGLY ARE OTHER ALLIES WILLING TO FIGHT FOR TURKISH EXCEPTIONS? WHAT ARE ALLIED ATTITUDES OWARD THE TURKISH DESIRE O EXCLUDE NON-EUROPEAN TRKISH FRONTIERS? (A.) GREEK DEL IN-FORMED SUB-COMMITTEE SEVERAL MONTHS AGO THAT IT WAS OPPOSED TO ANY TERRITORIAL EXCEPTIONS FOR PARTICIPATING STATES (EXCEPT OF COURSE US AND CANADA). GREEKS HAV NOT COMMENTED FURTHER ON THIS ISSUE OR ON SPECIFIC URKISH QUESTIONS EITHER AT SUB-COMMITTEE OR A CAUCUSES BUT THEY WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY SUPPORT PREDICTABLE CYPRIOT OBJECTIONS TO EXEMPTIONS FOR MERSIN-ISKENDERUN AREA OF TURKEY AND MAY INSIST ON EXEMPTIONS FOR GREECE IF TURKS SEEK TO EXCLUDE AEGEAN AND REST OF MEDITERRANEAN COASTS AS WELL. OTHER ALLIES ON SUB-COMMITTEE SEEM SYMPATHETIC TO TURKISH DESIRE EXCLUDE THEIR NON-EUROPEAN FRONTIERS AND WOULD PROBABLY SUPPORT TURKS ON THIS POINT AT SUB-COMMITTEE. THERE HAVE, HOWEVR, BEEN NO SIGNS OF SUPPOR FROM ANY OF THE ALLIES FOR THE ADDITIONAL EXEMPTIONS TURKS WANT OPPOSITE CYPRUS AND IN CENTRAL ANATOLIA OR FOR THOSE THEY MAY WANT ALONG AEGEAN AND THE RES OF HEIR MEDITERRANEAN COAST. OTHER ALLIES HAVE TAKEN POSITION THAT THEY ARE WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 GENEVA 07545 191921Z

ON THESE ISSUES AND HAVE STUGHT TO KEEP DETAILS OF TURKISH PROBLEM FROM SURFACING AT SUB-COMMITTEE. PRIVATELY, HOWEVER, BRITISH, FRENCH, AND FRG HAVE INDICATED STRONG CONCERN ABOUT THESE ADDIIIONAL TURKISH EXEMPTIONS AND WE THINK IT UNLIKELY THAT TURKS WILL BE ABLE TO DEVELOP ANY SUBSTANTIAL SUPPOR FROM ALLIES REGARDING THESE AREAS.

9. (Q.) HOW WOULD TURKS RECONCILE DESIRE TO EXCLUDE AREA FACING CYPRUS WITH THEIR INTEREST IN DOWNPLAYING CYPRUS ISSUE IN GENERAL AT CSCE? (A.) AT CAUCUSES, TURKS HAVE ARGUED, LAMELY, THAT EXCLUSION OF MERSIN-ISKENDERUN AREA HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH CYPRUS AND THAT THE EXCLUSION IS SOUGHT BECAUSE THESE PORTS RECEIVE SUPPLIES FOR THEIR TROOPS IN NORTHEAS TURKEY OPPOSITE SOVIET FRONTIER. PRIVATELY, TURKISH REP ON SUB-COMMITTEE HAS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SURFACING OF THESE TURKISH DEMANS WOULD ENRAGE

CYPRIOIS AND EMBROIL SUB-COMMITTEE IN CYRPUS ISSUE. HE HAS
CITED THIS AS ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF THE DIFFICULT POSITION IN WHICH
HIS DELEGAION HAS BEEN PLACED BY ITS INSRUCTIONS FROM TURKISH
GENERAL STAFF. IN EFFORT TO AT LEAST DEFER SUCH AN IMBROGLIO,
TURKISH REP HAS BEEN COOPERATING WITH OTHER ALLIES IN AVOIDING
DISCUSSION OF DETAILS OF TURKISH PROBLEM AT SUB-COMMITTEE.
TURKISH DEL IS OBVIOUSLY RELUCTANT TO PRESS ITS FULL DEMANDS
AT SUB-COMMITTEE WITHOUT BEING ABLE COUNT ON SUBSTANTIAL ALLIED
SUPPOR. IF, DESPITE TURKISH EFFORTS HERE AND IN BRUSSELS,
THIS SUPPORT IS NOT FORTHCOMING, WE THINK TURKISH DEL WOULD SEEK
SOME MODIFICATION OF ITS INSTRUCTIONS. AS TURKS HERE HAVE
ALREADY INDICATED (GENEVA 6451), THEIR AUTHORITIES MIGHT BE MORE
AMENABLE TO MODERATING THEIR DEMANDS IF IT ALSO BECAME APPARENT
THAT SUB-COMMITTEE'S NEGOTIATIONS ON OTHER PARAMETERS AND ON
NAURE OF COMMITMEN WERE LEADING TO A SUBSTANTIAL WATERING-
DOWN OF HE MANEUVER CBM. DALE

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